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I
Empiricism is the family of theories which in one or another way locate the source or at very least the test of 
contingent knowledge in experience – specifically, in sensory experience. More circumstantially: it is the 
family of theories which variously require experiential grounds for concepts to have content or applicability, 
or for expressions in a given language to have sense. In these versions of a formulation, due allowance is 
made for the thought that the content of perceptual states, suitably construed, are to be considered the 
occasion or basis for certain kinds of fundamental judgments from which, together with other premises, our 
less fundamental judgments about the world (or things other than the content of those states of sensitivity 
themselves) can be inferred. 
In a qualified sense of this broadly characterised position, Russell was an empiricist, and his epistemology 
remained in that qualified sense empiricist throughout its development. But he was also critical of certain 
forms of empiricism, and the focus of his own concerns were such that his aims in formulating 
epistemological views, and his evolving attempts to realise these aims in detail, are not straightforwardly 
traditional. The chief reason for this is that his overarching concern was the question of how science is 
related to subjective experience, beginning (in the work done in 1911-14) with attempts to show how the 
fundamental concepts of physics can be derived from experience, and ending (in 1948) by shifting attention 
to the question of the non-empirical features of knowledge-acquisition required for bridging the gap between 
experience and science.
In these aims for epistemology Russell was remarkably consistent throughout the period 1911- 48, which is 
to say, from the time he finished work on the first edition of PM until his last major philosophical book, HK. 
His concern was not the traditional epistemological one of showing that knowledge is justified by experience, 
where this task is typically specified by a response to sceptical arguments. Russell was thoroughly Lockean in 
his attitude to the theory of knowledge, in the sense that he did not think scepticism a serious option, and 
therefore did not waste time attempting to rebut it. Rather, he conceived epistemology's proper task as one 
of displaying how one gets from sense experience to science. For Russell this was an explanatory, not a 
justificatory, task.
In the cluster of texts addressing the question of the experience-science relation in the immediate post-PM 
period, Russell describes his aim as showing how physics is 'verified' by observation and experiment – by 
which he meant: having its predictions confirmed by these means. Given that all that can be directly 
observed are the data of sense, he saw the question as one of explaining the correlation of the contents of 
the physical world with the data of sensory experience by which they are alone verifiable . He did not put the 
point by saying that claims about the content of the physical world are verified (still less justified) by sensory 
experience; and this is neither an accidental nor a merely historically-conditioned trick of formulation. It is a 
feature of robust realism not to construe the point of epistemology as being the justification of knowledge-
claims, but as being an explication of the relation between what the claims are about and the nature of 
experience. 'Justifying science by grounding it in experience' and 'showing how physics succeeds in being an 
empirical science, based on observation and experiment' are two different aims, and Russell's was the latter.
In PP, which gives the outlines of Russell's early view in popular form, the project begins by adopting the 
Cartesian air of a justificatory, scepticism-rebutting enterprise. The same is true of the discussion in IMT and 
Russell's replies in Schilpp. But that was because Russell saw the principal task of showing how experience 
and science relate as the obverse of the coin whose reverse is the more familiar form of discussion in which 
experience is invoked as the ground of knowledge. Because Russell assumed throughout that science is (or 
at least is on the way to discovering) the truth about the world (and his considered views consistently 
respected this assumption), he did not see epistemology's task to be the defence of science against doubt, 
but instead to be the demonstration of how finite human subjectivity acquires knowledge of the objective 
reality which science describes. In showing this, it also shows that the degree of certainty possible in 
contingent knowledge is less than absolute. In this sense, Russell was happy to concede something to 
scepticism without being much troubled by it; after all – so in effect he thought – what else is to be expected 
from contingent empirical knowledge.
In the earlier phases of his endeavour Russell saw the task of technical philosophy (philosophy conceived as 
logic; in fact, though, this aspect of Russell's endeavour is more accurately described as metaphysics) as 
principally being one of showing how the fundamental concepts of science (as he then took them to be) –
space, time, causality and matter  can be constructed, and in his view this was a more important and more 
interesting matter than the epistemological question of how one relatively insignificant fragment of reality –
humanity – manages more or less successfully to represent the rest of reality to itself. It is easy to overlook 
the fact that these two of Russell's tasks – the logical construction of the then-conceived fundamental 
scientific concepts, and the question of how finite subjective experience connects with scientific knowledge –
are different, although of course they impinge upon one another at most points. But Russell's attention came 
rapidly to focus almost exclusively on the epistemological task, to which the larger part of his strictly 
philosophical writings after 1911 were addressed.
What changed over time in Russell's thought after 1911 was not his epistemological aim, but the strategies
he successively adopted to try to achieve it. Perhaps because science itself dramatically altered the question 
of which concepts are fundamental to it (space and time had become space-time in Einstein's theories, and 
matter had vanished in the wake both of them and quantum theory), Russell ceased to look for a logical 
construction of these specific concepts. Indeed, he abandoned the logical constructivist programme long 
before the likes of Carnap and Goodman attempted them, and before Wisdom had shown that getting the 
world out of sense-data without residue is impossible.
The continuities and developments in Russell's relation-of-sense-to-science project are well displayed as the 
similarities and contrasts between his description of the project's aims, and of the methods to be employed 
in carrying it out, in the 1911-14 writings and HK in 1948. Commentators generally take at face value 
Russell's own claim, in MPD, that in AMi (1921) he abandoned not just the nomenclature of the sense-datum 
theory but what it was trying to achieve; and this is taken among other things to mark a more expressly 
'neutral monist' turn as the metaphysical basis of his epistemological efforts until, in his very late work, 
another and final shift of perspective occurs, this time away from efforts to carry out the original project and 
towards the task of identifying the non-empirical supplements which, by that stage, he saw as the chief 
interest in discussing the bridge over the experience-science gap. But in fact it can be shown that despite the 
asseverations of MPD and the apparent elimination of the subject in AMi (courtesy of Russell's by then 
further developed conception of the 'neutral monist' stance), the underlying theme of specifying the 
connections between experience and science remained. Of course, from the period of AMi onward Russell 
changed the terms of the relation at issue dramatically; acquaintance vanished, and was replaced (to begin 
with) by 'noticing' (experiential salience) and successor conceptions. Acquaintance and the subject seemed 
to go so intimately together that their departure appeared jointly necessary; but it is no surprise to find the 
epistemic subject still in view in HK, having been merely in disguise in the interim.
The purpose in what follows is accordingly to illustrate, by way of an account of the development of Russell's 
project, the remarkable consistency of aim it displays. I do this by tracing the project's history, chiefly to 
establish an accurate characterisation of it, but also to provide a corrective to the impression that in 
epistemology Russell merely offered a sequence of ad hoc moves in response to a problem which has since 
been understood, but even then was already beginning to be recognised, as misconceived, viz. the 
endeavour to erect a justificatory theory of knowledge on the flawed Cartesian grounds of deriving certainty 
from the private data of experience. But to repeat: Russell's task was, interestingly and significantly, 
different from that; he did not see epistemology as a justificatory enterprise aimed at refuting scepticism, 
but as a descriptive enterprise aimed at explaining the fact (which he did not question) that finite subjects 
attain scientific knowledge. He was thus a naturalist long before Quine or anyone else, despite rightly 
insisting, as later naturalists did not, that one cannot premise science in epistemology ; and he was far more 
consistent in his aims and principles than most (agreeing with Charles Broad ) have allowed.
Certain corollaries attend the picture I offer. One is that Hylton misdescribes Russell's turn to epistemological 
themes after PM as involving 'considerable concessions to psychologism'. Whatever else the label means, 
'psychologism' is at least the view that the objects of acquaintance and judgment (to use period Russellian 
terms for the purpose) cannot themselves be described independently of features attaching to them as a 
result of the psychological conditions of their apprehension. This is never Russell's claim, and indeed 
anything like it was expressly disavowed in his pre-PoM flight from idealism. Post-PM Russell was realist to 
excess, rather than psychologistic, in allowing a wider range of objective targets of acquaintance than a 
traditional empiricist would allow, embracing as it did both physical particulars and abstract entities of 
various kinds. So much is familiar. And this is not to deny that Russell's interests lay in connecting the 
content of psychological states (mental states of the subject-relatum in acquaintance and judgment) with the 
independent objects such states brought into the subject's ken; for, after all, it was the 'transition from 
sense to science' as he still called it at the end of his philosophical life (MPD 153) that was his focus, and this 
requires addressing the question of what and how much the psychological states of epistemic subjects can be 
said to give them of objective scientific truth.
A corollary of the consistency thesis which I here argue on Russell's behalf is that the celebrated derailment 
of Russell's project in TK, ascribed to Wittgenstein as a result of some (characteristically hyperbolic) remarks 
by Russell in a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell, might not be quite what it seems; for in a footnote added to 
the text of 'On Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description' when this 1911 essay was 
reprinted in ML in 1917, Russell remarks of his multiple relation theory of judgment, 'I have been persuaded 
by Mr Wittgenstein that this theory is somewhat unduly simple, but the modification which I believe it to
require does not affect [its fundamentals].' The same point occurs more fully in LLA where Russell discusses 
the difficulties faced by the theory, involving subordinate 'verbs'. He subsequently, somewhat without fanfare, 
abandoned the theory; but it is clear from the fact that he continued to the end with the larger project of 
clarifying the experience-science connection that he found his multiple relation theory of judgment to be 
inessential to it; and therefore the fact that Russell dismembered TK and left some parts of it unused is not 
the same as his abandoning the project in whose working out TK was a chapter.
II
A good way to begin is to observe the images Russell employs early and late in preparing readers for the 
epistemological task as he conceived it. In the Preface to HK he observes that the terms 'belief', 'truth', 
'knowledge' and 'perception' all have imprecise common uses which will require progressive clarification as 
the enquiry proceeds. 'Our increase of knowledge, assuming that we are successful, is like that of a traveller 
approaching a mountain through a haze: at first only certain large features are discernible, and even they 
have indistinct boundaries, but gradually more detail becomes visible and edges become sharper.' Compare 
this to what Russell says in TK of the ambiguities of the words 'experience', 'mind', 'knowledge' and 
'perception': 'The meanings of common words are vague, fluctuating and ambiguous, like the shadow thrown 
by a flickering street-lamp on a windy night; yet in the nucleus of this uncertain patch of meaning, we may 
find some precise concept for which philosophy requires a name' ‹ which, Russell concludes, should best be 
the common expressions themselves, made suitably definite. Imagery aside, part of the method of both early 
and late epistemology is thus characterised as the same: clarification of concepts, on one familiar view the 
central task of analysis characteristic of 'analytic philosophy'. But Russell also took the view that analysis is 
only the propaedeutical part of the story; more important (so he early believed and hoped) was the 
constructive task of showing how complexes of various kinds – and not least, knowledge of complexes – can 
be constructed out of simples – early on, the simples with which we are acquainted. The constructive task is 
the one which ended in failure, and the changes in Russell's epistemology are a direct function of the 
difficulties met with in the course of the project, which he increasingly saw as insurmountable. The hope had 
been to couple analysis and synthesis, the first activity preparing the way for the second, reflecting Russell's 
early ambition, formed on a walk one day in Berlin in the 1890s, to link abstract and scientific knowledge into 
a grand synthesis. 
The synthetic task failed, but one thing which did not change was the aim subserved by the method 
developed to carry it out. In TK Russell plunges straight into the task of analysing acquaintance, which he 
calls 'the simplest and most pervading aspect of experience', a dyadic relation (an important point, for 
cognate polyadic relations of higher order constitute something significantly different, namely, judgments) 
between a 'mental subject' and what turn out to be the catholically-conceived objects of its attitudes. This 
was to fulfil a promise implicit in the outline of a programme given in March 1911 in three lectures: the 
Aristotelian Society address 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description', and two lectures 
delivered in Paris, 'Le Realisme Analytique' and 'L'importance philosophique de la logistique'. In the first of 
these latter he reasserts his commitment to realism both in epistemology and as regards universals, and 
outlines the technique of analysis of complex into simples to which he there first applies the name 'logical 
atomism'. In that and the companion lecture he launches the work characteristic of the 1911-14 period, 
worked out in most detail in a series of papers ‹ 'On Matter' (1912), 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics' 
and 'On Scientific Method in Philosophy' (1914), and 'The Ultimate Constituents of Matter' (1915; the three 
latter are reprinted in ML) ‹ whose chief precipitate constitutes OKEW (1914). Notoriously, the project was 
first planned to result in TK; but the difficulties over the theory of judgment obliged Russell to dismantle the 
task into what he doubtless hoped would be more manageable components.
The project is sketched in a letter from Russell to Ottoline Morrell in October 1912. 'The sort of thing that 
interests me now is this: some of our knowledge comes from sense, some comes otherwise; what comes 
otherwise is called "a priori". Most actual knowledge is a mixture of both. The analysis of a piece of actual 
knowledge into pure sense and pure a priori is often very difficult, but almost always very important.' Russell 
had chosen both parts of the task: to trace the transition from sense to science, and to isolate the a priori 
elements of the latter and to axiomatise them, as a preparation for defining the central concepts (space, 
time, causality and matter itself). Arguably, the epistemological task came to seem pressing to Russell for 
the two reasons that whereas, at the outset, the business of defining the fundamental concepts of physics 
appeared to be a straightforward parallel to defining the fundamental concepts of arithmetic, it quickly 
transpired that the relation of sense to science was not easy to carry out, and moreover that it was a 
necessary preliminary to completing the task of logically constructing the concepts of physics from whatever 
primitive concepts could be discovered in the then fundamental areas of physics, electrodynamics and 
classical mechanics, together with the relations between them. The reason for the latter is that the empirical 
content of the primitives requires that they themselves be constructible from sensory experience, as required 
by the principle that everything we know must be anchored at last in acquaintance. 
Russell accordingly deferred the attempt to construct science's central concepts to deal with the 
epistemological questions first. It is instructive to see how these, in their own right, came to seem to him 
problematic, given that his first sketch of them (in PP) was an optimistic one, in that it canvassed the 
traditional questions about the relation of experience to knowledge with a robust acceptance of the fallibility 
of such knowledge, and the presence in it of assumptions or principles themselves neither independently 
testable nor matters of logic alone.
III 
In PP Russell introduced the label 'sense-data' to designate what is immediately known in sensation: 
particular instances in perceptual awareness of colours, sounds, tastes, smells and textures, each class of 
data corresponding to one of the five sensory modalities. Not only must sense-data be distinguished from 
acts of sensing them, they must also be distinguished from objects in space outside us with which we 
suppose them associated. Russell's primary question therefore was: what is the relation of sense-data to 
these objects?
Russell was not, as noted, concerned to address scepticism. His tack was to say that although sceptical 
arguments are strictly speaking irrefutable, there is nevertheless 'not the slightest reason' to suppose them 
true (PP p 17). Instead he assembles persuasive considerations in support of the view that having sense-
data provides access to reasonable knowledge of things in space. First, we can take it that our immediate 
sensory experiences have a 'primitive certainty'. We recognise that when we register sense-data which we 
naturally regard as associated with, say, a table, we have not said everything there is to be said about the 
table. We think, for example that the table continues to exist when we are not perceiving it, and that the 
same table is publicly available to more than one perceiver at a time. This makes it clear that a table is 
something over and above the sense-data that appear to any given subject of experience. But if there were 
no table existing independently of us in space we should have to formulate a complicated hypothesis about 
there being as many different seeming-tables as there are perceivers, and explain why nevertheless all the 
perceivers talk as if they were perceiving the same object. 
But note that on the sceptical view, as Russell points out, we ought not even to think that there are other 
perceivers either, for if we cannot refute scepticism about objects, we are as badly placed to refute 
scepticism about other minds. 
Russell short-circuits the difficulty by accepting a version of the argument to the best explanation. It is 
simpler and more powerful, he argues, to adopt the hypothesis that, first, there are physical objects existing 
independently of our sensory experience, and, secondly, that they cause our perceptions and therefore 
'correspond' to them in a reliable way. Following Hume, Russell regards belief in this hypothesis as 
'instinctive'. 
To this, he argues, we can add another kind of knowledge, namely, a priori knowledge of the truths of logic 
and mathematics. Such knowledge is independent of experience, and depends only on the self-evidence of 
the truths known. When perceptual knowledge and a priori knowledge are conjoined they enable us to 
acquire general knowledge of the world beyond immediate experience, for the first kind of knowledge gives 
us empirical data and the second permits us to draw inferences from it. 
These two kinds of knowledge can each be further divided into subkinds, described by Russell as immediate 
and derivative knowledge respectively. He gives the name 'acquaintance' to immediate knowledge of things. 
The objects of acquaintance include particulars, that is, individual sense-data (and perhaps ourselves), and 
universals. Derivative knowledge of things Russell calls 'knowledge by description', which is general 
knowledge of facts made possible by combination of and inference from what we are acquainted with. 
Immediate knowledge of truths Russell calls 'intuitive knowledge', and he describes the truths so known as 
self-evident. These are propositions which are just 'luminously evident, and not capable of being deduced 
from anything more evident'. For example, we just see that '1 + 1 = 2' is true. Among the items of intuitive 
knowledge are reports of immediate experience; if I simply state what sense-data I am now aware of, I 
cannot (barring trivial slips of the tongue) be wrong. 
Derivative knowledge of truths consists of whatever can be inferred from self-evident truths by self-evident 
principles of deduction.
Russell concedes that despite the appearance of rigour introduced by the availability of a priori knowledge, 
we have to accept that ordinary general knowledge is only as good as its foundation in the 'best explanation' 
justification and the instincts which render it plausible. Ordinary knowledge amounts at best therefore to 
'more or less probable opinion'. But when we note that probable opinions form a coherent and mutually 
supportive system – the more coherent and stable the system, the greater the probability of the opinions 
forming it – we see why we are entitled to be confident in them.
An important feature of Russell's theory concerns space, and particularly the distinction between the all-
embracing public space assumed by science, and the private spaces in which the sense-data of individual 
perceivers exist. Private space is built out of the various visual, tactual and other experiences which a 
perceiver co-ordinates into a framework with himself at the centre. But because we do not have 
acquaintance with the public space of science, its existence and nature is a matter of inference.
IV
Thus Russell's first version of a theory of knowledge, and because its chief outlines are found in PP it is the 
one most familiarly associated with his name. But he was by no means content with the expression of it in PP, 
which after all was a popular book and did not essay a rigorous exposition of its theses. The technical papers, 
TK and OKEW which followed were his considered versions of these same questions, and mark an advance 
over this first sketch. One difference between the theories of PP and OKEW is that Russell had come to see 
that the experiencing subject's basis for knowledge – the sense-data that appear to him alone, and his 
intuitive knowledge of the laws of logic – is insufficient as a starting point. He accordingly placed greater 
weight on an experiencer's memories, and his grasp of spatial and temporal relations holding among the 
elements of occurrent experience. The subject is also empowered to compare data, for example as to 
differences of colour and shape. Ordinary common beliefs, and belief in the existence of other minds, are still 
excluded.
This appeal to an enriched conception of cognitive capacities required at the foundations of knowledge is 
almost invariably made by empiricist epistemologists – consider Locke and Ayer also – when the thin beams 
of sensory experience and inference are found, as they invariably are, to be insufficient to bear the weight of 
knowledge. 
With this enriched basis of what he now called 'hard data' Russell reformulated the question to be answered 
thus: 'can the existence of anything other than our own hard data be inferred?' His approach was first to 
show how we can construct, as an hypothesis, a notion of space into which the facts of experience – both the 
subject's own and those he learns by others' testimony – can be placed. Then, to see whether we have 
reason for believing that the spatial world is real, Russell gives an argument for believing that other minds 
exist, because if one is indeed entitled to believe this, then one can rely on the testimony of others, which, 
jointly with one's own experience, will underwrite the view that there is a spatial (a real) world. 
This strategy is ingenious. In 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics' Russell adds an equally ingenious way 
of thinking about the relation of sense-experience to its objects. In PP he had said that we infer the existence 
of physical things from sense-data; now he described them as functions of or 'constructions' out of sense-
data. This employs the technique of logic in which a thing of one (more complex) kind can be shown to be 
analysable into things of another (simpler) kind. Russell was here relying on what he called the 'supreme 
maxim of scientific philosophising', namely the principle that 'wherever possible, logical constructions are to 
be substituted for inferred entities.' Concordantly with this principle, physical objects are to be analysed as 
constructions out of sense-data – but not out of actual or occurrent sense-data only, but out of possible 
sense-data too. For actual and possible sense-data Russell coined the term 'sensibilia' by which is meant 
'appearances' or, in Russell's phrase, 'how things appear', irrespective of whether they constitute sense-data 
currently part of any perceiver's experience. This is intended to explain what it is for an object to exist when 
not being perceived. 
An important aspect of this view, Russell now held, is that sensibilia are not private mental entities, but part 
of the actual subject-matter of physics. They are indeed 'the ultimate constituents of the physical world', 
because it is in terms of them that verification of common-sense and physics ultimately depends. This is 
important because we usually think that sense-data are functions of physical objects, that is, exist and have 
their nature because physical objects cause them; but verification is only possible if matters are the other 
way round, with physical objects as functions of sense-data. This theory 'constructs' physical objects out of 
sensibilia; the existence of these latter therefore verifies the existence of the former.
V 
Such was the epistemology Russell developed in the period to 1914. Instead of developing this distinctive 
theory further, Russell abandoned it. In later work, particularly AMt and HK, he reverted to treating physical 
objects, and the space they occupy, as inferred from sense-experience. A number of considerations made 
him do this. One was his acceptance of the standard view offered by physics and physiology that perception 
is caused by the action of the environment on our sensory surfaces. 'Whoever accepts the causal theory of 
perception,' he wrote (AMt p 32), 'is compelled to conclude that percepts are in our heads, for they come at 
the end of a causal chain of physical events leading, spatially, from the object to the brain of the percipient'. 
In AMi he gave up talk of 'sense-data', and ceased to distinguish between the act of sensing and what is 
sensed. His reason for this relates to his acceptance – long in coming, for he had repeatedly resisted it in 
print – of James's 'neutral monism'.
Another reason for Russell's abandonment of the sensibilia theory was the sheer complexity and, as he came 
to see it, implausibility of the views he tried to formulate about private and public spaces, the relations 
between them, and the way sensibilia are supposed to occupy them. He makes passing mention of this 
cluster of problems in MPD, before there reporting, as his main reason for abandoning the attempt to 
construct 'matter out of experienced data alone,' that it 'is an impossible programme ... physical objects 
cannot be interpreted as structures composed of elements actually experienced' (MPD p 79). This last remark 
is not strictly consistent with Russell's stated view in the original texts that sensibilia are not, and do not 
have to be, actually sensed; MPD gives a much more phenomenalistic gloss to the theory than it originally 
possessed. But it touches upon a serious problem with the theory: which is that it is at least problematic to 
speak of an 'unsensed sense-datum' which does not even require – as its very name seems per contra to 
demand – an intrinsic connection to perception. 
In these early endeavours Russell gave only passing attention to other important questions in epistemology 
which he later, by contrast, came to emphasise. They concern the kind of reasoning traditionally supposed to 
be the mainstay of science, namely, non-demonstrative inference. It was some years before Russell returned 
to consider these questions: the main discussion he gives is to be found in HK, but promissory notes are 
issued in AMt and IMT.
VI
Acceptance of James's 'neutral monism' was an important turning point. Summarily stated, James's theory is 
that the world ultimately consists neither of mental stuff, as idealists hold, nor material stuff, as materialists 
hold, nor of both in problematic relation, as dualists hold, but of a neutral stuff from which the appearance of 
both mind and matter is formed. By Russell's own account, he was converted to this theory soon after 
finishing LLA. He had written about James's views in 1914, and rejected them; in LLA itself he was more 
sympathetic, though still undecided; but finally in a paper entitled 'On Propositions' (1919) he embraced the 
theory, and used it as a basis for AMi. 
The question that came to seem key to Russell is whether consciousness is the essence of the mental, given 
that, in line with traditional views, consciousness is itself taken to be essentially intentional. In light of 
Russell's difficulties with the multiple relation theory of judgment it is pointful to remember its partial 
ancestry in Meinong's view that the intentional relation has at least the three elements of act, content and 
object. In accepting neutral monism Russell was abandoning the irreducible assumptions of any such view. 
First, he says, there is no such thing as the 'act'. The occurrence of the content of a thought is the 
occurrence of the thought, and there is neither empirical evidence nor theoretical need for an 'act' in addition. 
Russell's diagnosis of why anyone might think otherwise is that we say, 'I think so-and-so', which suggests 
that thinking is an act performed by a subject. But he rejects this, for reasons similar to those advanced by 
Hume, who held that the notion of the self is a fiction, and that we are empirically licensed to say no more, 
on occasions of specifying them, than that there are bundles of thoughts.
Secondly, Russell criticises the relation of content and object. Meinong and others had taken it that the 
relation is one of direct reference, but in Russell's view it is more complicated and derivative, consisting 
largely of beliefs about a variety of more and less indirect connections among contents, between contents 
and objects, and among objects. Add to this the fact that, in imagination and non-standard experiences like 
hallucination, one can have thoughts without objects, and one sees that the content-object relation involves 
many difficulties – not least, Russell says, in giving rise to the dispute between idealists who think that 
content is more significant than objects, and realists who think objects are more significant than content. 
(Russell's use of these labels, although standard, is misleading: we should for accuracy substitute the label 
'anti-realist' for 'idealist' here; this is because whereas, at bottom, realism and anti-realism are indeed 
differing theses about the relation of contents to objects, and thus are epistemological theses, idealism is a 
metaphysical thesis about the nature of the world, namely, that it is ultimately mental in character. This 
point is frequently missed in philosophical debate, so Russell is in good company. ) All these difficulties can 
be avoided, Russell claims, if we adopt a version of neutral monism. 
In James's view the single kind of 'primal stuff', as he called it, is 'pure experience'. Knowing is a relation into 
which different portions of primal stuff can enter; the relation itself is as much part of pure experience as its 
relata. 
Russell could not go along with quite all of this. He thought that James's use of the phrase 'pure experience' 
showed a lingering influence of idealism, and rejected it; he preferred the use made by others of the term 
'neutral-stuff', a nomenclatural move of importance because whatever the primal stuff is, it has to be able –
when differently arranged – to give rise to what could not appropriately be called 'experience', for example 
stars and stones. But even with this modified view Russell only partially agreed. He thought that is right to 
reject the idea of consciousness as an entity, and that it is partly but not wholly right to consider both mind 
and matter as composed of neutral-stuff which in isolation is neither; especially in regard to sensations – an 
important point for Russell, with his overriding objective of marrying sense to physics. But he insisted that 
certain things belong only to the mental world (images and feelings) and others only to the physical world 
(everything which cannot be described as experience). What distinguishes them is the kind of causality that 
governs them; there are two different kinds of causal law, one applicable only to psychological phenomena, 
the other only to physical phenomena. Hume's law of association exemplifies the first kind, the law of gravity 
the second. Sensation obeys both kinds, and is therefore truly neutral. 
Adopting this version of neutral monism obliged Russell to abandon some of his earlier views. One important 
change was abandonment of 'sense-data'. He did this because sense-data are objects of mental acts, which 
he now rejected; therefore, since there can be no question of a relation between non-existent acts and 
supposed objects of those acts, there can be no such objects either. And because there is no distinction 
between sensation and sense-data – that is, because we now understand that the sensation we have in 
seeing, for example, a colour-patch just is the colour-patch itself – we need only one term here, for which 
Russell adopts the name 'percept'.
Before accepting neutral monism Russell had objected to it on a number of grounds, one being that it could 
not properly account for belief. And as noted, even when he adopted the theory it was in a qualified form; 
mind and matter overlap on common ground, but each has irreducible aspects. Nevertheless what at last 
persuaded him was the fact, as it seemed to him, that psychology and physics had come very close: the new 
physics both of the atom and of relativistic space-time had effectively dematerialised matter, and psychology, 
especially in the form of behaviourism, had effectively materialised mind. From the internal viewpoint of 
introspection, mental reality is composed of sensations and images. From the external viewpoint of 
observation, material things are composed of sensations and sensibilia. A more or less unified theory 
therefore seems possible by treating the fundamental difference as one of arrangement: a mind is a 
construction of materials organised in one way, a brain more or less the same materials organised in another. 
A striking feature of this view is, surprisingly, how idealist it is. Russell had, as noted, charged James with 
residual idealism. But here he is arguing something hardly distinguishable: that minds are composed of 
sensed percepts–viz. sensations and images–and matter is a logical fiction constructed of unsensed percepts. 
Now Russell had often insisted (using his earlier terminology) that sensibilia are 'physical' entities, in 
somewhat the sense in which, if one were talking about an item of sensory information in a nervous system, 
that datum would be present as impulses in a nerve or activity in a brain. But then nerves and brains, as 
objects of physical theory, are themselves to be understood as a constructions from sensibilia, not as 
traditionally-understood 'material substance', the concept of which physics has shown to be untenable. At the 
end of AMi (pp 305, 308) Russell accordingly says that 'an ultimate scientific account of what goes on in the 
world, if it were ascertainable, would resemble psychology rather than physics ... [because] psychology is 
nearer to what exists'. This explains Russell's notorious claim that 'brains consist of thoughts' and that when 
a physiologist looks at another person's brain, what he 'sees' is a portion of his own brain (Schilpp p 705). 
For robuster versions of materialism this aspect of Russell's view is hard to accept. But it is not the only 
difficulty with his version of neutral monism. Not least among others is the fact that he failed in his main aim, 
which was to refute the view that consciousness is essential to the distinction between mental and physical 
phenomena. He had not of course attempted to analyse consciousness quite away; his aim was rather to 
reduce its importance to the mind-matter question. But images, feelings and sensations, which play so 
central a role in his theory, stubbornly remain conscious phenomena, whereas the sensibilia (by definition 
including unsensed sensa) which constitute the greater part of matter are not. Russell accepted this, but 
tried to specify a criterion of difference which did not trade on these facts, namely, the criterion of 
membership of different causal realms. But whereas that difference is open to question – and even if it exists 
might be too often hard to see – the consciousness difference is clear-cut. Relatedly, the intentionality which 
characterises consciousness cannot be left out of accounts of knowledge; memory and perception are 
inexplicable without it. Russell later acknowledged this point, and gave it as a reason in MPD for having to
return to the question of perception and knowledge in later writings. 
He also later came to abandon the idea – anyway deeply unsatisfactory from the point of view of a theory 
supposed to be both neutral and monist – that images and feelings are essentially mental, that is, not wholly 
reducible to neutral-stuff; for in a very late essay he says, 'An event is not rendered either mental or 
material by any intrinsic quality, but only by its causal relations. It is perfectly possible for an event to have 
both the causal relations characteristic of physics and those characteristic of psychology. In that case, the 
event is both mental and material at once'. This, for consistency, is what he should have argued in AMi itself, 
where only sensations have this character. 
But this view in turn generates another problem, which is that it comes into unstable tension with a view to 
which Russell returned after AMi, namely, that the causes of percepts are inferred from the occurrence of the 
percepts themselves. As noted earlier, Russell wavered between treating physical things as logical 
constructions of sensibilia and as entities inferred as the causes of perception; he held this latter view in PP 
and returned to it after AMi. But on the face of it, one is going to need a delicate connection between one's 
metaphysics and one's epistemology in order to hold both that minds and things are of one stuff, and that 
things are the unknown external inferred causes of what happens in minds. So those parts of the legacy of 
AMi which remain in his later thinking raise considerable difficulties for his views there about matter. 
VII 
One of the chief reasons for Russell's reversion to a realistic, inferential view about physical things was the 
difficulty inherent in the notion of unsensed sensa or, in the later terminology, percepts. As noted above, the 
idea had been to replace inferred entities with logically constructed ones. If physical things can be logically 
constructed out of sensibilia, then two desiderata have been realised simultaneously: the theory is 
empirically based, and inferred entities have been shaved away by Ockham's Razor. But it is obvious that the 
idea of unsensed sensa (or unperceived percepts) is, if not indeed contradictory, at least problematic. It 
makes sense – although, without a careful gloss, it is metaphysically questionable – to talk of the existence 
of possibilities of sensation; but to talk of the existence of possible sensations arguably does not (recall 
Russell's definition of sensibilia as entities having the 'same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data 
without necessarily being data to any mind'.) If the choice lay between inferred material particulars and non-
actual perceptions existing unperceived, it would seem best to accept the former. This is just what Russell 
himself came to think. But he did not return to the cruder form of inferential realism held in PP; he had 
something more ingenious – though in the end no more successful –up his sleeve. 
Another reason for Russell's reversion to realism was his recognition that the notion of causality is 
problematic for phenomenalism. Things in the world seem to affect one another causally in ways hard to 
explain on the mere basis of reports of sense-experience. Moreover, a causal theory of perception is a 
natural and powerful way of explaining how experience itself arises. In Russell's mature philosophy of science, 
contained in AMt and HK, he did not opt for a Lockean view which says that our percepts resemble their 
causal origins, on the ground that we cannot be directly acquainted with things, and therefore cannot expect 
to know their qualities and relations. Rather, he now argued, changes in the world and our perceptions are 
correlated, or co-vary, at least for orders of things in the world that our perceptual apparatus is competent to 
register (we do not, for example, perceive electrons swarming in the table, so there is no associated 
covariation of world and perception at that level). The correspondence between percepts and things is one of 
structure at the appropriate level: 'Whatever we infer from perceptions it is only structure that we can validly 
infer; and structure is what can be expressed by mathematical logic' (AMt 254). And this means that we 
have to be 'agnostic' about all but the physical world's mathematical properties, which is what physics 
describes (ibid 270). 
Russell had come to think that the best candidate for what is metaphysically most basic in the world is the 
'event'. Objects are constructed out of events in the following way: the world is a collection of events, most 
of which cluster together around a multitude of 'centres' thus constituting individual 'objects'. Each cluster 
radiates 'chains' of events, which interact with and react upon chains radiating from other centres–among 
which are perceivers. When a chain interacts with the events constituting the perceptual apparatus of a 
perceiver, the last link in the chain is a percept. Since everything is ultimately constituted of events, they are 
in effect the 'neutral-stuff' of which minds and material things are made. Minds are clusters of events 
connected by 'mental' relations, not least among them memory; otherwise there is no metaphysical 
difference between mind and matter. Finally, the interrelations of event-chains is what scientific causal laws 
describe.
This view enabled Russell to formulate the argument he had long been trying to state satisfactorily, namely, 
that percepts are parts of things. For on this view it is not the case that there are events which constitute 
things, and then in addition other events which are perceptions of those things; rather, there are just events 
constituting the object, some of which are percepts – these being the terminal events of the chains radiating 
from the object which interact with events constituting the perceiver. 
This theory is inferential not in the earlier sense in which the causes of percepts, lying inaccessibly beyond a 
veil of perception, are guessed from the nature of the percepts themselves. Rather, the inference is from 
certain terminal events, viz. percepts – which are interactions between (using the term heuristically) 'mental' 
events and that level of structure in the rest of the event-world with which the 'mental' events are capable of 
interacting – to the clusters and chains of events constituting the world as a whole. 
In AMt the core of the theory is the idea that knowledge of the world is purely structural. We know the 
qualities and relations as well as the structure of percepts, but we know only the structure of external events, 
not their qualities. This seems somewhat reminiscent of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities, but it is not; Russell is saying that all we can infer from our percepts is the structure of the qualities 
and relations of things, not the qualities and relations themselves; and that this is the limit of knowledge. 
This theory has a fatal flaw, which was quickly recognised by the mathematician M. H. A. Newman and set 
out in an article published soon after the appearance of AMt. It is that since our knowledge of the structure 
of events is not a mere result of our stipulating them, but is manifestly non-trivial, it follows that our 
inferential knowledge cannot be limited solely to questions of structure. This is because – to put the point by 
a rough analogy – a number of different worlds could be abstractly definable as having the same structure, 
and if they were, knowledge of their structure alone could not separate them and in particular could not 
individuate the 'real' one. If science genuinely consists of discoveries about the world through observation 
and experiment, the distinction between what we observe and what we infer cannot therefore be collapsed 
into a distinction between pure structure and qualities. 
Russell accepted Newman's point: 'You make it entirely obvious that my statements to the effect that 
nothing is known about the physical world except its structure are either false or trivial, and I am somewhat 
ashamed not to have noticed it myself.'
VIII
As repeatedly noted, the common thread linking Russell's earlier and later views is the aim of securing the 
move from perception to the objects of physical theory. On his view, this move must either be inferential, in 
which it takes us from the incorrigible data of sense to something else, or it is analytic, that is, consists in a 
process of constructing physical entities out of percepts. On the later view just reported, the inference has a 
special advantage over more usual inferential theories, in that the inference is not from one kind of thing to 
another, but from one part of something to its other parts. 
In his earlier views Russell had accorded primary reality to sense-data and built everything else out of them. 
On the later view, reality belongs to events as the ultimate entities, and an important change of emphasis 
was introduced: percepts remain immediate and as certain as anything can be, but they are not construed as 
having accurately to represent the physical world, which, in the picture offered by science as the most 
powerful way to understand it, is anyway very different from how it appears. 
Crucially, however, there remains a familiar and major problem about whether inferences from perception to 
the world are secure. A large part of Russell's aim in HK was to state grounds for taking them to be so. 
Throughout his thinking about the relation of perception and science he was convinced, as his above-quoted 
remark in the October 1912 letter to Ottoline Morrell shows, that something has to be known independently 
of experience for scientific knowledge to be possible. Earlier, as noted, he thought that purely logical 
principles provide such knowledge. But he now saw that logic alone is insufficient; we must know something 
more substantial. His solution was to say that inference from perception to events is justified in the light of 
certain 'postulates' which nevertheless state contingent facts about the word. So stated, Russell's view 
immediately reminds one of Kant's thesis that possession of 'synthetic a priori knowledge' is a condition of 
the possibility of knowledge in general, a view which Russell robustly dismissed in the Preface to HK. The 
difference is explained by the tentative and probabilistic account that Russell, in this last major attempt to 
state a theory of knowledge, felt was all that could be hoped for. 
Two features of Russell's approach in HK explain this result. One is that he now thought that knowledge 
should be understood in 'naturalistic' terms, that is, as a feature of our biological circumstances, taken 
together with the way the world is constituted. The other is that he had come to make a positive virtue of the 
fact (which he always otherwise accepted) that contingent knowledge is never certain, but at best merely 
credible to some degree. This second point enters into the detailed working out of the views in HK. The first 
makes its appearance whenever Russell needs to justify the justifications which HK attempts to provide for 
scientific knowledge.
When data have a certain credibility independently of their relations to other data, Russell describes them as 
having a degree of 'intrinsic' credibility. Propositions having some intrinsic credibility lend support to 
propositions inferred from them. The chief question then becomes: how do propositions with some measure 
of intrinsic credibility transfer that credibility to the hypotheses of science? Another way of framing the 
question is to ask how reports of observation and experiment can function as evidence. This is where 
Russell's postulates come in. 
There are five postulates. The first, 'the postulate of quasi-permanence', is intended to replace the ordinary 
idea of a persisting thing: 'given any event A, it happens very frequently that, at any neighbouring time, 
there is at some neighbouring place an event very similar to A'. Thus the 'things' of common-sense are 
analysed into sequences of similar events. The ancestor of this idea is Hume's analysis of the 'identity' of 
things in terms of our propensity to take a sequence of resembling perceptions to be evidence for a single 
thing, as when you have perceptions of a rose bush every time you go into the garden, and therefore take it 
that there is a single persisting rose bush there even when no perceivers are present. 
The second, 'the postulate of separable causal lines', states that 'it is frequently possible to form a series of 
events such that, from one or two members of the series, something can be inferred as to all the other 
members'. For example, we can keep track of a billiard ball throughout a game of billiards; common-sense 
thinks of the ball as a single thing changing its position, which according to this postulate is to be explained 
by treating the ball and its movements as a series of events from some of which you can infer information 
about the others. 
The third is 'the postulate of spatio-temporal continuity', designed to deny 'action at a distance' by requiring 
that if there is a causal connection between two events that are not contiguous, there must be a chain of 
intermediate links between them. Many of our inferences to unobserved occurrences depend upon this 
postulate. 
The fourth is 'the structural postulate', which states that 'when a number of structurally similar complexes 
are ranged about a centre in regions not widely separated, it is usually the case that all belong to causal lines 
having their origin in an event of the same structure at the centre'. This is intended to make sense of the 
idea that there exists a world of physical objects common to all perceivers. If six million people all listen to 
the Prime Minister's broadcast on the wireless, and upon comparing notes find that they heard remarkably 
similar things, they are entitled to the view that the reason is the common-sense one that they all heard the 
same man speaking over the airwaves. 
The fifth and last is 'the postulate of analogy', which states that 'given two classes of events A and B, and 
given that, whenever both A and B can be observed, there is reason to believe that A causes B, then if, in a 
given case, A is observed, but there is no way of observing whether B occurs or not, it is probable that B 
occurs; and similarly if B is observed, but the presence or absence of A cannot be observed'. This postulate 
speaks for itself. (HK 506-12)
The point of the postulates is, Russell says, to justify the first steps towards science. They state what we 
have to know, in addition to observed facts, if scientific inferences are to be valid. It is not advanced science 
which is thus justified, but its more elementary parts, themselves based on common-sense experience.
But what is the sense of 'know' here? On Russell's view, the knowing involved in 'knowledge of the 
postulates' is a kind of 'animal knowing', which arises as habitual beliefs from the experience of interaction 
with the world and experience in general. It is far from being certain knowledge. 'Owing to the world being 
such as it is,' Russell says, 'certain occurrences are sometimes, in fact, evidence for certain others; and 
owing to animals being adapted to their environment, occurrences which are, in fact, evidence of others tend 
to arouse expectation of those others. By reflecting on this process and refining it, we arrive at the canons of 
inductive inference. These canons are valid if the world has certain characteristics which we all believe it to 
have' (HK 514-5). These are the common-sense facts that the postulates in effect embody, and it is in this 
sense that we 'know' them. They are implied in the inferences we make, and our inferences are by and large 
successful; so the postulates can be regarded as in a sense self-confirming.
Although Russell thinks of the postulates as something we know a priori, it is clear that their status is odd. 
They are in fact empirical in one sense, since they either record or are suggested by experience. What gives 
them their a priori status is that they are treated as known independently of empirical confirmation (except 
indirectly in practice), rather than as generalisations in need of such justification. In effect Russell selected 
some general contingent beliefs which are especially useful to have as premises in thinking about the world, 
and elevated them to the dignity of postulates. Their indirect justification, in turn, is that on the whole they, 
or the results of their application, work. Allied to the extremely modest ambition Russell has for epistemology 
in HK this might be enough. But it has no pretensions to be a theory of knowledge as traditionally conceived, 
nor a rigorous account of non-demonstrative reasoning. 
These last remarks suggest why Russell's arguments in HK received little response, much to his 
disappointment. He recognised well enough that canons of evidence and scientific reasoning are worth 
investigating only if we can be confident that, if we got them right, they would reliably deliver science. But 
the most that Russell's argument establishes is that, so far, the general principles on which our empirical 
thinking relies have been largely successful. But this looks like exactly the kind of unbuttressed inductive 
inference Russell was anxious to caution against, citing the example of the chicken who, on being fed day 
after day, grew increasingly pleased with the world – until the day the butcher came. 
In particular, we have no guarantee against the possibility that use of the postulates leads to falsehood, 
either occasionally or in some systematic way. Now this possibility is in effect allowed by Russell in asking 
very little of epistemology. The complaint must therefore be that the argument in HK is in fact an admission 
of failure, when taken in the light of the epistemological tradition. Descartes and his successors in modern 
philosophy raised questions about the nature of knowledge and how we get it precisely so that they could 
distinguish between some enterprises – alchemy, astrology, and magic, say – and others – chemistry, 
astronomy, and medicine, say – which differ not merely in the number of genuinely practical applications 
they offer, but in telling us something true about the world; and where, moreover, the latter fact explains 
the former, and opens the way to more of both by the same route. Moreover, our ancient prejudices and 
animal beliefs might be controverted in the process, as indeed happens: for the world depicted by science is 
remarkably different from the world of common-sense. But Russell in HK says the utility of applications and 
those same animal habits of belief are the only final justification we can hope for in epistemology. This is 
very much less than the project of epistemology traditionally aims to achieve, and it is much less than 
Russell himself hoped to achieve on first launching his epistemological project after PM.
IX
Russell had charged Kant with a 'Ptolemaic counter-revolution' in the Preface to HK, but it is not clear that 
HK itself escapes a Ptolemaic tinge. The postulates are expressly not transcendentally necessary framework 
features in any sense comparable to Kant's categorial concepts, or to any other species of foundational 
principle. They are in effect rules of thumb, 'distilled' as Russell puts it, from the epistemological pragmatics 
of common sense, and justified – if that is the right thing to expect them to be – by their manifest utility in 
scientific enquiry and ordinary life. 
Nevertheless, they prompt two thoughts. One is that a solid argument can be given in favour of 
strengthening postulates of the kind envisaged by Russell into structural conditions of inquiry. For what are 
in effect temperamental reasons it was not open to Russell to consider investigating, by means of 
transcendental arguments, what is required for the possibility of the kind of knowledge in which science 
consists. No doubt the precipitate of something like the postulates would result; and that is a suggestive 
thought. Such an argument would be in fact Russellian, because it would follow his example in his earlier 
epistemological work of seeking the logical distribution of the problem, so to speak, as when, in the 1911-14 
work, he distinguished what was logically primitive from what was derived from it, and how both parts of this 
classification related to one another in the structure they formed. 
It is of course no more than a coincidence, but a remarkable one, that at the time Russell was writing HK, 
Wittgenstein was coming to not dissimilar conclusions in On Certainty – as if they had been travelling 
different routes and arriving at near-points at the end of the journey. Wittgenstein's late interest in problems 
of scepticism and knowledge is rather striking in being straightforward workaday philosophy of just the kind 
he earlier dismissed as fly-in-the-bottle. His interest in epistemology therefore looks like acceptance that 
philosophical problems are real ones after all, amenable to investigation – and even solution. His contribution 
is to insist on the internal connection between the concepts of knowing and doubting, and equally to insist 
that epistemic justification is provided by the conceptual scheme within which talk of knowledge and doubt 
alone gets content. The similarities between the very late Russell and Wittgenstein lie in the thought that (to 
put the matter neutrally as between them) a given area of discourse requires that we accept certain things in 
order to be able to get along in it – the 'grammatical' propositions which key a discourse's sense, in 
Wittgenstein; the postulates required by inquiry, for Russell. Of course the parallel is not direct, but it is 
suggestive. 
